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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Kay has appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment, quieting title in
appellee EBF to a parcel of real property located in Juab County, Utah. EBF was granted
summary judgment pursuant to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. In its ruling,
the district court concluded that the burden of proof in boundary by acquiescence cases is
proof by a preponderance of the evidence rather than proof by clear and convincing
evidence. Although the district court concluded that the preponderance of the evidence
standard was the proper standard, it nevertheless evaluated EBF's claims under the higher
standard of clear and convincing evidence, and concluded that EBF had established a
boundary by acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the district
court granted EBF summary judgment and denied Kay's cross motion for partial
summary judgment.
Issue for Review: Did the district court err in concluding that the burden of proof
in boundary by acquiescence cases is proof by a preponderance of the evidence?
Standard of Review: De novo. "Burden of proof questions typically present
issues of law that an appellate court reviews for correctness." Martinez v. MediaPaymaster Plus, 2007 UT 42, f 41, 164 P.3d 384.
Issue for Review: If boundary by acquiescence claims must be established by
clear and convincing evidence, did the district court err in granting EBF summary
judgment, concluding that the element of "mutual acquiescence" was established by clear
and convincing evidence?

1

Standard for Review: De novo. "We review a district court's decision to grant
summary judgment for correctness, giving no deference to the district court. Our review
is limited to determining whether the district court correctly applied the summary
judgment standard in light of the undisputed material facts." Raab v. Utah Ry. Co., 2009
UT61,110,221P.3d219.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This matter involves a dispute over a piece of real property between adjoining
landowners which is located in Juab County, Utah. At issue is a claim of boundary by
acquiescence by EBF. For over forty years, the parties' predecessors in interest and their
families treated an old barbed-wire fence as the boundary between their respective
properties located near Mona, Utah.

The families conducted all of their respective

farming and cattle operations within the boundary of the old fence. The parcel at issue is
approximately six acres in size and is narrow and triangular in shape.

EBF's

predecessors have occupied the disputed parcel up to the fence line marking the boundary
between the properties for over forty years.
On May 26, 2005, EBF filed suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court in and for
Juab County, seeking to quiet title in the disputed property and also claiming trespass
against Kay. (R. 1-5). On or about September 17, 2007, EBF filed a motion for partial
summary judgment along with a supporting memorandum, seeking a judgment and
decree of quiet title in the disputed property. (R. 82-241). On October 25, 2007, Kay
filed a cross motion for summary judgment. (R. 260-261). After briefing was complete,
the district court heard oral arguments on March 13, 2008. (R. 411). On May 13, 2008,
2

the district court issued a written Ruling and Order, ruling in favor of EBF. (R. 413-437).
On June 26, 2008, the district court entered its Order on Cross Motions for Summary
Judgment and Defendant Steven L. Kay's Motion to Strike. (R. 440-451).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
1.

The location of the original fence at issue in this action (the "Original

Fence") is reflected on a survey prepared by Ludlow Engineering and Land Surveying,
signed on August 9, 2004 (the "Survey"). (R. 78, 211, 239).
2.

The Survey accurately reflects the locations of fence lines that existed on

the various properties at the time the Survey was conducted. (R. 78-81, 239).
3.

EBF holds the fee-title ownership interest in certain real property located

near Mona, Juab County, Utah, described in that certain Special Warranty Deed recorded
on March 13, 1998, as Entry No. 00212715, in Book 0391, at Page 0181 (the "EBF
Property"). (R. 204-209, 238).
4.

Kay holds the fee-title ownership interest in certain real properly located

near Mona, Juab County, Utah, described in that certain Warranty Deed recorded on June
20, 2004, as Entry No. 00235619, in Book 0466, at Page 0641 (the "Kay Property"). (R.
202,238).
5.

Kay's predecessor-in-title received a patent to Kay's land from the United

States in 1905. (R. 266-267, 297).
6.

EBF's predecessor-in-title received a patent to EBF's land from the United

States in 1905. (R. 263-264, 297).
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7.

Through mesne conveyances, EBF's property was conveyed to EBF in

1998. (R. 235-236).
8.

Through mesne conveyances, Kay's property was conveyed to Kay in

2004. (R. 237-238).
9.

John L. Fowkes, a prior owner of the Kay Property, died on December 14,

1957. (R. 333,348).
10.

The Kay Property was conveyed on or about November 23, 1959 by L. Earl

Fowkes, the administrator of the Estate of John L. Fowkes, to Maud Fowkes. (R. 193198,238).
11.

Maud Fowkes died on July 9, 1965. (R. 329-331, 348).

12.

The Kay Property was conveyed by Maud Fowkes to Blanch Fowkes

Cloward (a dauther of John and Maud Fowkes) pursuant to a Declaration and Deed of
Trust (R. 189-191,237).
13.

Blanch F. Cloward died on Ocotber 9, 1990. (R. 327, 348).

14.

On February 24, 1970, a Deed of Conveyance was recorded to convey the

Kay Property from Blanch F. Cloward to her sister, Olive F. Stanley, and Olive's
husband, Daryl H. Stanley. The Deed of Conveyance to the Stanleys did not include the
adjoining, triangular parcel to the west, which is now known as XB1433-21. (R. 187,
237).
15.

On May 22, 1995, the Kay Property was conveyed by Olive F. Stanley and

Daryl H. Stanley to Daryl H. Stanley and Olive F. Stanley, as trustees of the Stanley
Family Trust, u/a/d May 8, 1995. (R. 185, 237).
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16.

On June 30, 2004, Olive F. Stanley and Daryl H. Stanley, as trustees of the

Stanley Family Trust, u/a/d May 8, 1995, conveyed the Kay Property to Kay pursuant to
a Warranty Deed. (R. 202, 237).
17.

Daryl H. Stanley died on July 3, 2005. (R. 325, 348).

18.

Tom Fowkes is the son of Earl and Darlene Fowkes and the grandson of

John L. Fowkes, a prior owner of the Kay Property. (R. 155, 235).
19.

Tom Fowkes, who was born in 1947, testified that he has lived at his

family's home near Mona, Utah, for "just about 59 years," except for a short period of
time when the family lived in town. (R. 155, 158, 235).
20.

Earl Fowkes, Tom's father, passed away several years ago, but Darlene

Fowkes still lives in Mona. (R. 155, 235).
21.

Earl Fowkes started farming his family's property before 1947. (R. 150,

22.

Earl Fowkes had three siblings: Olive, Blanche, and Lucille, none of whom

235).

participated in farming activities on the family property.

Olive Stanley is the only

remaining living sister of Earl Fowkes. (R. 150, 155, 235).
23.

The Fowkes family dry farmed their side of the Original Fence. (R. 156,

24.

Tom Fowkes began farming his family's property when he icwas big

234).

enough to go" with his father. (R. 156, 234).
25.

During the brief time that the Fowkes family lived in the town of Mona,

Tom Fowkes continued to work on the family farm. (R. 154, 234).
5

26.

Tom Fowkes farmed his family's property from his childhood until "[u]p

into the '70s, I would assume, maybe even later than that." (R. 152, 234).
27.

The Fowkes family continued farming activities on their property until it

was sold to Kay. (R. 152-153, 234).
28.

Regarding the boundary between the properties at issue, Tom Fowkes

testified as follows:
Q: All right. . . . Looking again at this survey, just based on
your experience with the property and working on the farm,
where did you understand the boundary to be between the
properties we've been talking about?
A: On the fenceline.
(R. 154,234).
29.

The Original Fence was in existence when Tom Fowkes was born. (R. 153,

30.

Tom Fowkes further testified that his family maintained the Original Fence

233).

on occasion. (R. 147, 233).
31.

Tom Fowkes also had dealings with the Andrews family, the prior owners

of the EBF property, "as long as they were here." (R. 152, 233, 235-236).
32.

Dale Fowkes, Tom Fowkes' brother, conducted farming activities on the

family property until it was sold to Kay. (R. 138, 233).
33.

Dale Fowkes testified that his family dry farmed their property, rotating hay

and grain, with "the exception of once in awhile" when they were able to "get the water
to come across." These farming activities continued until the year 2001. (R. 136, 233).
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34.

In earlier years, the Fowkes family ran livestock on their property. (R.

35.

Dale Fowkes farmed the family property under a lease from Daryl and

Olive Stanley for about ten years before the property was sold to Kay. (R. 140-141, 233).
36.

Dale Fowkes testified that the Original Fence was in existence when he was

born in 1949. (R. 139,233).
37.

Regarding his contact with the Andrews family and the boundary between

the properties, Dale Fowkes testified as follows:
Q: How much contact did you have with the - the Andrews?
A: Quite a bit.
Q: What kinds of - what kinds of contact would you have
with the Andrews as you were—
A: OhQ: —working on the farm?
A: Oh, we traded machinery back and forth, you know,
talked - talked fairly often. I did work for them and they
come and helped me at different times, you know? It's just a
- a neighborly situation.
Q: And what kind of work did you do for the Andrews?
A: Oh, I baled hay for them, trucked, cleaned ground for
them. And, like I say, we traded machinery back and forth at
different times. And then just - just kind of a social thing,
you know, just as neighbors talk back and forth about
different things. When I was younger I worked for them, you
know, when I was coming through school and things like that.
Q: What did the Andrews do with their side of the - the
property or their side of the fence line?
A: When I was younger that - they - they planted some they did a little dry land work up there but that really wasn't
their thing, so they planted the grass and run livestock in
there.
Q: Okay. Based on your experience with the - the property
that we've been talking about and you've testified today what
was your understanding where the boundary was between
your family's property and the Andrews property?
7

A: The - fence - where the fence was.
Q: Did you ever speak with anyone in the Andrews family or
others who owned that property to the east about the
boundary?
A: No.
Q: Were there ever any disputes about where the boundary
was between the two properties?
A: Not that I'm aware of.
(R. 139,232-233).
38.

Eldon Verness Andrews ("Vemess Andrews") was one of the prior owners

of the EBF property. (R. 236).
39.

Pursuant to a Warranty Deed, the Andrews family conveyed title to the

North Vi of the Southeast lA of Section 4 to Vemess Andrews. (R. 170-173, 231).
40.

Vemess Andrews was involved with his family's business operations on the

Andrews property from the time it was purchased in 1955 until it was sold to EBF in
1998. (R. 121,231).
41.

Vemess Andrews testified that initially the family dry farmed the property

for about six or seven years beginning in 1955 or 1956. (R. 126, 230).
42.

After the Andrews family dry farmed their property for a period of time,

they began to run livestock on their property. Vemess Andrews testified as follows:
Q: Were you involved with the cattle operation for the
duration of the time your family owned the property?
A: Yes.
Q: And just so I understand that cattle operation, then
occurred on . . . occurred to the east of the fenceline. Is that
correct?
A: Yes.
(R. 126, 229-230).

R

43.

Verness Andrews testified regarding the Original Fence as follows:
Q: Was the fence there when your family bought the
property?
A: Yes, it was there. It'd been there for quite a few years.
Q: Do you know what the owners to the west of the fence did
with their property?
A: Well, they, they farmed most of it.
Q: What kind of farming would they do?
A: Well, they had hay and some grain.
Q: How often did you come in contact with the owners on
the west side of the fence?
A: Oh, probably daily. I mean, we were neighbours. We, we
were out working the fields, you know, at the same time.

(R. 126, 229).
44.

Regarding the boundaries between the properties, Vemess Andrews

testified as follows:
Q: Did you ever have any discussions with the Fowkes
family there on the west of the fence about where the
boundary was between the properties?
A: Not that I know of, no.
Q: Were there ever any disputes about where the boundary
was?
A: No.
Q: What was your understanding of where the boundary was
between the properties?
A: Where, where the fence went. Where it originally was.
(R. 125, 228-229).
45.

Vemess Andrews also testified that when they began their livestock

operation on the property, the Andrews family had to improve the condition of the fence
because some of the fence was old and had rusty wire. (R. 126, 228).
46. Referring to a couple of occasions when some wayward cows were able to get
through the fence separating the properties, Vemess Andrews testified as follows:
9

There was no dispute about the boundary. The fence was the
boundary. They, they didn't say, ;You got to move your
fence' or anything else. They said, 'Your cows are on my
property.'
(R. 124, 228).
47.

According to Verness Andrews, the Fowkes family farmed on their side of

the Original Fence, the Andrews family operated on their side, "[a]nd the existing fence
as we understood it was the boundary line - property line." (R. 124, 228).
48.

Vemess Andrews also testified regarding the boundary between the

properties as follows:
Q:. . . . I'm asking if- whether there was a discussion, if there
was - if people talked about the fenceline.
A: Not to my knowledge. We just accepted that as the
boundary line.
***

Q: Okay. You understood that the fence was the boundary.
Correct?
A: Yes, we operated as such.
(R. 121, 123-124,227-228).
49.

Vemess Andrews further testified that, based on the way the Original Fence

was constructed with what he called "pioneer barbed wire," he believed the Original
Fence "could have been there thirty, forty years before we came" in 1955. (R. 123, 227).
50.

Delos Andrews, brother of Vemess Andrews participated in the family's

ranch operations from 1971 until the Andrews family sold the EBF Property to EBF in
1998. (R. 114-115, 227).
51.

Delos Andrews testified that the Andrews family used their side of the

Original Fence for grazing activities. (R. 115, 227).
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52.

Delos Andrews testified that the Original Fence "was there when we came

in . . . the spring of '55, and I suppose it had been there for I'd suspect another 50 years
beyond that. But I have no idea." (R. 108, 226).
53.

According to Delos Andrews, during the time the Andrews family owned

their property, the Original Fence was always visible. (R. 115, 226).
54.

Delos Andrews farther testified that the Fowkes family would farm their

land right up to the fence line, and the Andrews family would have their livestock graze
up to the fence line. (R. 115, 226).
55.

With respect to the boundary between the properties, Delos Andrews

testified as follows:
Q: Did you ever have any discussion with the property
owners to the west of the fence line about the fence as the
boundary of the property or between the - the two properties?
A: I never recall ever having a conversation about the fence
line that's - in any regard.
Q: Did you understand that the fence was the boundary
between the two properties?
A: Yes.
Q: I'm talking - I'm referring to the old fence.
A: Yes, I understand that the fence line was the property line
and [] established the ownership.
(R. 114,225-226).
56.

Delos Andrews further testified that there was "never a dispute about the

fence" as being the boundary between the properties. (R. 104, 225).
57.

Delos Andrews also testified that the Fowkes family never acted in a

manner inconsistent with the Original Fence being the boundary between the properties.
(R. 114,225).
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58.

Oral C. Taylor was also one of the prior owners of EBF Property, and is a

brother-in-law of Verness Andrews and Delos Andrews. (R. 114, 225).
59.

Oral Taylor was involved with the Andrews family business operations on

the EBF Property from the time it was purchased in 1955 until it was sold to EBF in
1998, although he had less frequent involvement in the business after suffering a heart
attack in about 1977. (R. 96-97, 225).
60.

Regarding the boundary between the properties, Mr. Taylor testified as

follows:
Q:. . . . What, what was your understanding, generally where
the boundary was between your family's property and the
Fowkes' property?
A: This whole fenceline that was there when we bought the
place. It was right there - it was there. As far as I know, that
was original fence.
Q: Do you know when the fence was built?
A: I have no idea. It was long before my time.
(R. 93, 223-224).
61.

Sometime after purchasing the Kay Property in 2004, Kay removed

portions of the Original Fence, and constructed a new fence located to the east of the
Original Fence, enclosing approximately six (6) acres of the EBF Property. (R. 88-89,
223, 467).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
I.

The district court correctly concluded that the burden of proof in

establishing boundary by acquiescence is by a preponderance of the evidence. Although
Kay argues that the standard of proof required is clear and convincing evidence, he has
12

not identified any Utah case law in support of his position. EBF, however, has identified
a prior Utah Supreme Court decision which directly indicates that a claim for boundary
by acquiescence is established by a preponderance of the evidence. In addition, two Utah
appellate court decisions contain dicta which indicate that Utah courts apply the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.

As discussed herein, proof by a

preponderance of the evidence satisfies the due process requirements of Utah
Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. The other legal doctrines referenced by Kay
which employ the clear and convincing standard of proof are readily distinguishable from
claims of boundary by acquiescence, and the district court did not err in refusing to adopt
the higher standard of proof advocated by Kay.
II.

Although the district court ruled that the correct standard of proof for

boundary by acquiescence cases is the preponderance of the evidence standard, the
district court nevertheless analyzed EBF's claims under the clear and convincing
evidence standard and concluded that EBF was entitled to summary judgment on its quiet
title action based on boundary by acquiescence.

Therefore, even if this Court is

persuaded that boundary by acquiescence claims require proof of clear and convincing
evidence, the district court should be affirmed because it analyzed the claims under this
more rigorous standard of proof.

Furthermore, the only element of boundary by

acquiescence which is at issue on this appeal is the element of "mutual acquiescence."
Kay does not dispute on appeal that the parties are adjoining landowners, that there was
occupation up to a visible line marked by the Original Fence, and that the Original Fence
has been in existence for a period of time greater than twenty years. In ruling in favor of
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EBF, the district court followed Utah precedent and found that the facts presented by this
case established by clear and convincing evidence that the parties had mutually
acquiesced in the Original Fence as the boundary between the two properties.
III.

For the first time, Kay has raised arguments regarding the law of

abandonment of easements which were never raised before the trial court. Because these
arguments were never raised by Kay at the trial level nor were they ever considered by
the district court, Kay has not preserved this issue for appeal and these arguments should
not be considered by this Court. However, even if the Court were to consider this new
argument, the law of abandonment of easements is distinguishable from boundary by
acquiescence claims and is therefore inapplicable to this appeal.
IV.

Because the district court properly ruled in favor of EBF by finding that a

boundary by acquiescence was established by clear and convincing evidence, the district
court did not err in denying Kay's cross motion for summary judgment, by which Kay
sought a decree that a boundary by acquiescence had not been created.

ARGUMENT
I.

The district court correctly concluded that the burden of proof in
establishing boundary by acquiescence is by a preponderance of the
evidence.
a.

Absent an indication to the contrary, the presumed standard of
proof in civil cases is a preponderance of the evidence.

This Court has held that "the standard of proof generally applied in civil
proceedings is the preponderance of the evidence standard." Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d
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931, 934 (Utah 1998) (citing Johns v. Shulsen, 111 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 19Z6); Lipman
v. Industrial Comm }n, 592 P.2d 616, 618 (Utah 1979); Morris v. Farmers Home Mut. Ins.
Co., 500 P.2d 505, 507 (Utah 1972); Barken v. Board of Oil Gas & Mining, 920 P.2d
1176, 1182 (Utah 1996) (holding that "proper standard of proof in the administrative
context is generally the 'preponderance of the evidence standard' absent 'allegation of
fraud or a statute or a court rule requiring a higher standard.'") (citation omitted)
(emphasis added).
In Johns, this Court noted that "[i]t is universally recognized that the standard of
proof in civil actions is by a preponderance of the evidence." Johns, 111 P.2d at 1338
(citing Morris, 500 P.2d at 507). Although Kay argues that the standard of proof to
establish boundary by acquiescence is actually clear and convincing evidence, he has not
identified a statute or a court rule requiring the higher standard of proof which he
advocates is the proper standard. In the absence of a contrary indication requiring a
higher standard of proof, Utah courts deciding civil matters apply the preponderance of
the evidence standard.

Accordingly, the district court was correct in ruling that a

boundary by acquiescence under Utah law must be established by a preponderance of the
evidence.
b.

This Court has already held that a boundary by acquiescence is
established by a preponderance of the evidence and, as such, the
doctrine of stare decisis is applicable to this appeal.

The elements of a claim for boundary by acquiescence are well-settled. In RHN
Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f 23, 96 P.3d 935, 941, this Court stated as follows:
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"The elements of boundary by acquiescence are (i)
occupation up to a visible line marked by monuments, fences,
or buildings, (ii) mutual acquiescence in the line as a
boundary, (iii) for a long period of time, (iv) by adjoining
landowners."
RHN Corp. v. Veibell, 2004 UT, \ 23, 96 P.3d 935, 941 (quoting Jacobs v. Hafen,
917 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Utah 1996)).
The requirement that a boundary line must have been in existence "for a long
period of time" has been interpreted to mean a period of not less than twenty years. See_
Hobson v. Panguitch Lake Corp., 530 P.2d 792, 795 (Utah 1975); see_ also Staker v.
Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 420 (Utah 1990). At issue on this appeal is whether the aboverecited elements must be established by a preponderance of the evidence or whether the
higher standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence is required.
Utah courts have held that a party attempting to establish a boundary by
acquiescence bears the burden of establishing mutual acquiescence in the property line.
See e.g. Ault v. Holden, 2002 UT 33, f 18, 44 P.3d 781 (Utah 2002); see also Brown v.
Jorgensen, 2006 UT App. 168, f 14, 136 P.3d 1252, 1257 (Utah Ct. App. 2006). Kay
argues that "the burden of proof in boundary by acquiescence cases must be proof by
clear and convincing evidence." Appellant Brief, pg. 12. This position, however, is
directly contradicted by this Court's holding in Elias v. Lea, 1978 Utah LEXIS 1129, a
copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit 1 to EBF's Addendum.

In addition to these four elements, a fifth element referred to as the "objective
uncertainty requirement" was formerly necessary to establish a claim of boundary by
acquiescence. See Halladay v. Cluff, 685 P.2d 500 (Utah 1984). Halladay was overruled
by this Court's ruling in Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417, 424 (Utah 1990), thereby
eliminating this fifth element.
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In Elias, this Court considered a claim of boundary by acquiescence, ultimately
holding that the appellants had "failed in their proof of acquiescence in the fence as a
boundary." Id. at | 3. This decision was based on the finding that there was no proof
"that the respondent or any of his predecessors in interest ever had any knowledge that
the property east of the fence was being claimed by another." Id.

Significantly, in

connection with its discussion of the appellant's burden in establishing a boundary by
acquiescence, the Court held as follows:
[T]he following elements are established by a preponderance
of the evidence:
(1) Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely
by some monument,
(2) Acquies[c]ence in that line as a boundary
(a) by adjoining land owners, and
(b) for a long period of time.
Id at If 2-3.
This rule stated in Elias confirms that this Court applies the preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof in boundary by acquiescence cases. Consistent with Elias,
two Utah Court of Appeals decisions contain dicta indicating that a boundary by
acquiescence is established by a preponderance of the evidence.

In Gillmor v.

Cummings, 904 P.2d 703 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), the Utah Court of Appeals considered a
claim of boundary by acquiescence.

In considering the claim of boundary by

acquiescence, the appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding that a boundary by
acquiescence had not been established because there was evidence to support the trial
court's finding that the claimant "failed to show a permanent definite boundary line
existed for 20 years or more." Gillmor, 904 P.2d at 707. Gillmor then concluded that it
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found "sufficient evidence to support the trial court's finding that Cummings failed to
show by a preponderance of evidence that he had established a new boundary by
acquiescence." Id. This express reference to "a preponderance of evidence" as the
standard of proof required in establishing a boundary by acquiescence in reality merely
states the standard Utah courts have always employed.
Even more recently, in a 2009 decision, the Utah Court of Appeals considered a
claim of boundary by acquiescence and affirmed the trial court's legal conclusion that
"Pitt failed to prove 'by a preponderance of the evidence that the landowners occupied
the land up to a visible line for a complete period of 20 years.'" Pitt v. Taron, 2009 UT
App. 113, Tf 2, 210 P.3d 962. This holding again confirms that Utah appellate courts
apply the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof in deciding boundary by
acquiescence claims.
In contrast to the Utah authority cited herein which confirms the preponderance of
the evidence standard as the appropriate standard of proof, Kay has failed to identify a
single reported boundary by acquiescence case in this state which identifies clear and
convincing evidence as the standard of proof required. If a higher standard of proof were
required in establishing the elements of boundary by acquiescence, it is reasonable to
assume that this Court would have articulated "clear and convincing evidence" as the
appropriate standard of proof in one of the many previously reported decisions addressing
boundary by acquiescence claims spanning the last century.
Because Utah appellate courts apply the preponderance of the evidence standard
of proof, EBF urges this Court to follow the doctrine of stare decisis, and not depart from
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the standard of proof stated by this Court in Elias. In advocating clear and convincing
evidence as the standard to be employed, Kay is in fact asking this Court to overturn prior
precedent. This Court has held that "[t]hose asking us to overturn prior precedent have a
substantial burden of persuasion. This burden is mandated by the doctrine of stare
decisis." State v. Menzies, 889 P.2d 393, 398 (Utah 1994) (internal citation omitted),
cert, denied, 513 U.S. 1115. Regarding the doctrine of stare decisis, this Court has stated
as follows:
This doctrine, under which the first decision by a court on a
particular question of law governs later decisions by the same
court, is a cornerstone of the Anglo-American jurisprudence
that is crucial to the predictability of the law and the fairness
of adjudication.
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 (quoting State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269
(Utah 1993)).
When following precedent, this Court has stated:
The general American doctrine as applied to courts of last
resort is that a court is not inexorably bound by its own
precedents but will follow the rule which it has established in
earlier cases, unless clearly convinced that the rule was
originally erroneous or is no longer sound because of
changing conditions and that more good than harm will come
by departing from precedent.
Menzies, 889 P.2d at 399 (quoting John Hanna, The Role of
Precedent in Judicial Decision, 2 Vill. L. Rev. 367, 367 (1957)).
While EBF recognizes that this Court is not "inexorably bound" by its prior
decisions, the conditions which would justify a departure from the preponderance of the
evidence standard of proof are not present here.

There is simply no evidence that

conditions with respect to boundary by acquiescence claims have changed in recent
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years, thereby making the preponderance of the evidence standard no longer sound.
Likewise, there is no evidence that the rule stated in Elias was originally erroneous, or
that more good than harm will result by departing from precedent. Instead, the standard
of proof required in boundary by acquiescence actions has by and large been a non-issue,
as evidenced by the extensive Utah case law addressing boundary by acquiescence claims
which has not even discussed the required burden of proof. Accordingly, this Court
should reaffirm that the preponderance of the evidence standard of proof referenced in
Elias is the correct standard of proof in establishing a claim of boundary by acquiescence.
c.

Although reported cases from other jurisdictions do not uniformly
follow the same standard of proof in establishing boundary by
acquiescence claims, the better-reasoned decisions adhere to the
preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.

In its Ruling and Order on Cross Motions for Summary Judgment and Steven L.
Kay's Motion to Strike ("Ruling and Order"), the district court correctly noted that other
jurisdictions do not uniformly adhere to the same standard of proof in establishing claims
of boundary by acquiescence. See Ruling and Order, pgs. 17-18. (R. 420-421). Powell
on Real Property states as follows:
Whether there has been recognition and acquiescence is a
question of fact in which the burden of proof rests on the
person relying on the doctrine. Indeed, several states require
that the claimant prove recognition and acquiescence by clear
and convincing evidence or some closely allied standard,
although other courts require only a fair preponderance of the
evidence.

9 POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 68.05[8] (Michael Allan Wolfed.,
LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2007).
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Case law from Iowa, Maine, Minnesota, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont,
and Washington are cited by the Powell treatise as adhering to the clear and convincing
standard of proof

See_ id. Other jurisdictions, however, have explained the propriety of

employing a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof.
In Walters v. Snyder, 570 N.W.2d 301, 302 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997), the Michigan
Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court which had required that a claim
for boundary by acquiescence be established by "clear and positive proof rather than by
a preponderance of the evidence.

Walters specifically held that "the proper standard

applicable to a claim of acquiescence is proof by a preponderance of the evidence."
Walters, 570 N.W.2d at 303. The court reasoned that "application of the higher standard
of proof seems inappropriate to an acquiescence claim" because, unlike a claim for
adverse possession, "[a] claim of acquiescence does not require that the possession be
hostile or without permission." Id. Michigan appellate courts continue to apply the
preponderance of the evidence standard, as evidenced by a 2009 unpublished decision
wherein the appellate court affirmed the trial court's finding of a claim in favor of
boundary by acquiescence which, in accordance with Walters, was established by a
preponderance of the evidence. See. Crosby v. Post, 2009 Mich. App. LEXIS 2411, ^ 4
(unpublished).
2

The cases cited are Tewes v. Pine Lane Farms, Inc., 522 N.W.2d 801 (Iowa 1994); Dart
v. Thompson, 154 N.W.2d 82 (Iowa 1967); Crosby v. Baizley, 642 A.2d 150 (Me. 1994);
Davis v. Mitchell, 628 A.2d 657 (Me. 1993); Marja Corp. v. Allain, 622 A.2d 1182 (Me.
1993); Taylor v. Hanson, 541 A.2d 155 (Me. 1988); Calthorpe v. Abrahamson, 441 A.2d
284 (Me. 1982); Wojakn v. Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 298 (Minn. 1980); Mam v. Bohara,
367 N.W.2d 743 (N.D. 1985); Lien v. Beard, 478 N.W.2d 578 (S.D. 1991); Heath v.
Dudley, 530 A.2d 151 (Vt. 1987); Lilly v. Lynch, 945 P.2d 727 (Wash. App. 1997).
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Arkansas courts also apply a preponderance of the evidence standard to claims of
boundary by acquiescence. In Mann v. Hughes, 502 S.W.2d 465, 466 (Ark. 1973), the
Arkansas Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's finding "from a preponderance of the
evidence that the boundary had been fixed by common consent and acquiescence." In
affirming the chancery court's finding in favor of a claim for boundary by acquiescence,
the Arkansas Supreme Court noted that the testimony was conflicting and "created a
close question of fact." Mann, 502 S.W.2d at 467. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the
chancery court's finding, noting that ";[w]hen the evidence is conflicting or evenly
poised, or nearly so, the judgment of the chancellor on the question of where the
preponderance of the evidence lies is considered as persuasive.'" Id. (quoting Clark v.
Mathis, 486 S.W.2d 77 (Ark. 1972)).
As noted in the Powell treatise, "[a]mong the reasons given for the clear and
convincing standard are (1) to discourage aggressive, assertive action inconsistent with
good neighborliness, (2) to avoid a flood of litigation, and (3) to narrowly tailor a
doctrine that transfers title to property without compliance with the statute of fraud." 9
POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY

§ 68.05[8]. These factors, however, are not persuasive for

the very reasons given by the district court in this case. In its Ruling and Order, the
district court explained why it was unpersuaded that the clear and convincing standard of
proof should be applied in Utah:
First, the clear and convincing standard seems equally or
more likely than the preponderance standard to promote
aggressive behavior inconsistent with good neighborliness.
True, it seems that one is less likely, ex ante, to attempt to
establish an incorrect boundary when he knows he would be
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required, twenty years later, to prove acquiescence by clear
and convincing evidence as opposed to a preponderance of
the evidence. On the other hand, however, a recent grantee of
property is less likely to disturb a longstanding boundary if he
knows prior acquiescence may be proven by a mere
preponderance of the evidence. For similar reasons, it is not
clear that a preponderance standard would engender more
litigation than a clear and convincing standard. Finally, a
doctrine that permits transfer of ownership in contradiction of
record boundaries and without compliance with the statute of
frauds should be appropriately narrowed. But as noted above,
the doctrine itself is "already a restrictive doctrine," Veibell,
2004 UT P 29, and the Utah Supreme Court has expressed
reluctance to "unduly restrict" it. Id. P 28.
Ruling and Order, pg. 18. (R. 420).
The required elements of boundary by acquiescence under Utah law, as governed
by the preponderance of the evidence standard, are sufficient to protect owners with
deeded property interests. As this Court has noted in Stoker, "boundary by acquiescence
has always been restrictively applied in Utah." Staker, 785 P.2d at 423. For instance,
Utah courts strictly enforce the twenty-year acquiescence requirement. See, e.g., Jacobs,
917 P.2d at 1081 (concluding that 18 Vi -year period was insufficient for acquiescence).
Because boundary by acquiescence has always been restrictively applied by Utah courts,
there is no need to adopt a higher standard of proof to further restrict what is already a
restrictive doctrine. Under Utah law, property owners are sufficiently protected by the
required elements of boundary by acquiescence. Therefore, this Court should decline to
adopt the clear and convincing evidence standard advocated by Kay in this matter.
d.

Proof by a preponderance of the evidence in satisfaction of the
elements required for a claim of boundary by acquiescence
pursuant to Utah law does not offend the Due Process Clauses of the
Utah Constitution and the United States Constitution.
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Kay argues that the Due Process Clauses of the Utah Constitution and the United
States Constitution require that boundary by acquiescence claims be established by clear
and convincing evidence. While EBF agrees that both the Utah Constitution and the
United States Constitution protect real property owners against the deprivation of their
property rights , not every alteration of a property owner's rights must be established by
the standard of proof advocated by Kay in this action. Indeed, Kay has failed to identify
any authority to support the argument that a finding of boundary by acquiescence by a
preponderance of the evidence offends the requirements of due process. Significantly,
the cases relied upon by Kay in support of his due process arguments, i.e., Egbert v.
Nissan N Am., Inc., 2007 UT 64, 167 P.3d 1058 and Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418,
99 S. Ct. 1804, 60 L. Ed.2d 323 (1979), do not address the standard of proof required in
cases involving the alteration of real property rights.
In Egbert, this Court discussed the varying standards of proof, and noted that the
United States Supreme Court has applied the clear and convincing standard of proof "in
cases involving civil commitment, deportation, and denaturalization." Egbert, \61 P.3d
at 1062 (citations omitted).

Egbert also noted that the Utah Supreme Court had

previously held the clear and convincing standard of proof as the appropriate standard for
rebutting the '"presumption that parents act in the best interests of their children"5
because the "'presumption deals with parental liberty interests.'" Id. (quoting Uzelac v.

3

See Utah Const. Art. I § 7 ("No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property
without due process of law,"); See_ also United States Const. Amend. XIV ("No state
shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of law. . . .").
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Thurgood (In re Estate o/S.T.T.), 2006 UT 46, fflf 27-28, 144 P.3d 1083). However,
neither Addington nor Egbert even address the standard of proof required to satisfy due
process in a claim involving real property rights.
As EBF has already noted herein, this Court already treats boundary by
acquiescence claims as a "restrictive doctrine" and requires that each of the necessary
elements be met. See, Staker, 785 P.2d at 423; See. also Veibell, 2004 UT at If 29.
Evidence of the restrictive application of the boundary by acquiescence doctrine is
illustrated by the requirement under Utah law that the mutual acquiescence in the
boundary be established for a period of at least twenty years. Proof by a preponderance
of the evidence establishing the mutual acquiescence in an observable boundary by
adjoining landowners for such a long period time clearly satisfies the requirements of due
process in altering an owner's real property rights. Given the restrictive application of
boundary by acquiescence under Utah law, Kay's argument that due process requires
boundary by acquiescence claims to be established by clear and convincing evidence is
without merit and should be rejected by this Court.
e.

Because other legal doctrines referenced by Kay which govern the
alteration of real property rights are readily distinguishable from
the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, the district court did not
err in refusing to adopt the clear and convincing standard of proof.

Kay argues that boundary by acquiescence claims require proof by clear and
convincing evidence because certain other legal doctrines governing the alteration of
property rights also apply the heightened standard of proof. See Appellant's Brief, pgs.
12-15. Specifically, Kay argues that proof by clear and convincing evidence is required
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because Utah courts require clear and convincing evidence in cases involving public
dedication of land for use as a road or highway4, prescriptive easements5, deed
cancelation or reformation , and adverse possession founded on parol gifts.

These

arguments were considered by the district court and were properly rejected, with the
district court noting that Kay "overlooks what may be [] significant distinctions between
the above doctrines and boundary by acquiescence." Ruling and Order, pg. 16.
Claims involving the transfer of private land for public use are readily
distinguishable because "boundary by acquiescence cannot be established when one of
the adjoining tracts of land is part of the public domain." Carter v. Hanrath, 925 P.2d
960, 962 (Utah 1996). Because boundary by acquiescence cannot involve public land,
the same policy considerations for claims involving the transfer of private land for public
use do not apply. In Draper City v. Estate of Bernardo, 888 P.2d 1097, 1099 (Utah
1995), this Court stated that "[t]he law does not lightly allow the transfer of property
from private to public use. The public's taking of property in such circumstances as this
case presents requires proof of dedication by clear and convincing evidence." This same
concern regarding the transfer of private property to public use does not apply to
boundary by acquiescence claims and is therefore distinguishable.
Regarding claims for reformation of a deed, this Court has held that reformation
"is appropriate where the terms of the written instrument are mistaken in that they do not
4

See Campbell v. Box Elder County, 962 P.2d 806, 808 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
See Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
6
See Baker v. Pattee, 684 P.2d 632, 634 (Utah 1984); see also Gray v. Gray, 108 Utah
388, 160P.2d432.
1
See. Raleigh v. Wells, 81 P. 908, 910 (Utah 1905).
5
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show the true intent of the agreement between the parties. There are two grounds for
reformation of such an agreement:

mutual mistake of the parties and ignorance or

mistake by one party, coupled with fraud by the other party." Veibell, 2004 UT at | 36
(quoting Hottinger v. Jensen, 684 P.2d 1271, 1273 (Utah 1984)). These stated grounds
for reformation of a written instrument justify the application of a higher standard of
proof as they involve claims of mistake by one or both parties, or claim of fraud against
one party.

These elements, however, are inapplicable to a claim of boundary by

acquiescence which can only be established through mutual acquiescence in an
established boundary for a period of at least twenty years. As was noted by the district
court in this action, "[t]he elements required to reform a deed obviously differ from
boundary by acquiescence and it is not immediately apparent to the Court why use of the
same standard of proof in both contexts would be appropriate." Ruling and Order, pg.
16.
Similarly, Plaintiffs reliance on the doctrines of prescriptive easements and
adverse possession are also distinguishable because neither of those doctrines involve
mutual acquiescence in an accepted boundary. Instead, a claim of adverse possession
based on parol gift involves the adverse, hostile possession of property contrary to the
landowner's interest. See_ Raleigh, 81 P. at 910. Similarly, a prescriptive easement arises
from the use of the servient estate that is open, notorious, and adverse to the landowner's
interest. See_ Mar chant, 111 P.2d at 682 (citations omitted). This Court, however, has
characterized boundary by acquiescence claims differently. In Baum v. Defa, this Court
described the purpose served by boundary by acquiescence as follows:
27

The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence derives from
realization, ancient in our law, that the peace and good order
of society is best served by leaving at rest possible disputes
over long established boundaries. Its essence is that where
there has been any type of a recognizable physical boundary,
which has been accepted as such for a long period of time, it
should be presumed that any dispute or disagreement over the
boundary has been reconciled in some manner.
Baum v. Defa, 525 P.2d 725, 726 (Utah 1974) (citations omitted).
Simply put, unlike boundary by acquiescence claims, there is no element of
"mutual acquiescence" in claims for prescriptive easements and adverse possession
which indicate reconciliation in some manner or acceptance in a long-established
boundary. Furthermore, boundary by acquiescence does not require that possession be
hostile or without permission of the property owner. These very distinctions were the
basis for the Michigan appellate court's decision in Walters, discussed supra, to reject the
clear and convincing standard of proof in favor of the preponderance of the evidence
standard. See. Walters, 570 N.W.2d at 303. For the reasons discussed herein, application
of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence is clearly distinguishable from the other
legal doctrines relied upon by Kay which govern the alteration of real property rights.
Because the doctrine is distinguishable, this Court should affirm the district court's
refusal to adopt the clear and convincing standard of proof in boundary by acquiescence
cases.
f.

Kay has not experienced a taking of his real property rights because,
pursuant to the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, title to the
parcel of property in dispute had already vested in EBF's
predecessors-in-interest prior to the time of Kay's purchase of his
property in 2004.

28

Kay is incorrect in arguing that this case involves a "taking" that divested him of
his real property rights. See_ Appellant Brief, pg. 8. Clearly, this is not an eminent
domain action where Kay's property has been taken for a public use, for which he would
be entitled to compensation under Article I, section 22 of the Utah Constitution. See
Bagford v. Ephraim City, 904 P.2d 1095, 1097-98 (Utah 1995). Instead, this action
involves the establishment of a boundary by acquiescence by Kay's predecessors and
EBF's predecessors. Under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence, once the owners
mutually acquiesce in the boundary line for the requisite twenty-year period, title to the
property is vested in the owner by operation of law, and title cannot thereafter be
destroyed by later discovery of the true boundary. See_ Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f 31.
Consistent with this application of the doctrine, the district court concluded that a
boundary by acquiescence had been established by "the mutual acquiescence of the
Fowkes and Andrews families prior to Kay's purchase of the property, and that legal title
to the Disputed Property previously vested in EBF's predecessors-in-interest and has now
therefore vested in EBF up to the location of the Original Fence." See_ Ruling & Order,
pg. 25. (R. 413). As the district court noted, the property rights in the Disputed Property
had already vested in EBF's predecessors-in-interest prior to Kay's purchase of his
property. In other words, Kay was never the owner of the Disputed Property and never
had any ownership rights in the property at issue.

Instead, Kay received only the

property rights possessed by Kay's predecessor-in-interest, and Kay's ownership interest
was accordingly limited to that which was legally conveyed to him.

29

Consequently,

because the boundary by acquiescence was established prior to the time in which Kay
purchased his property in 2004, Kay has not experienced a taking of his property rights.

II.

Even if this Court is persuaded that boundary by acquiescence claims
must be established by clear and convincing evidence, the district court
should be affirmed because the district court found that applying the
clear and convincing standard of proof, EBF was entitled to summary
judgment on its claim of boundary by acquiescence.
a.

Kay's appeal does not challenge three of the four elements of
boundary by acquiescence in this action.

The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence requires "(1) occupation up to a visible
line marked by monuments, fences, or buildings, (2) mutual acquiescence in the line as a
boundary, (3) for a long period of time, (4) by adjoining land owners." Stoker, 785 P.2d
at 420. Kay does not argue that EBF has not met the first, third, and fourth elements. See
Appellant Brief pg. 2, "Issue for review"; see also Appellant Brief pg. 33 ("Mr. Kay
disputes only the allegation that his predecessors acquiesced in the fence as the boundary.
The remaining elements are undisputed.") Instead, Kay's appeal concerns whether the
evidence was sufficient to establish the element of mutual acquiescence.

See_ id.

Specifically, Kay seeks review of whether the evidence was sufficient to find by clear
and convincing evidence that mutual acquiescence in the boundary established by the
Original Fence had occurred. For the reasons discussed below, the district court was
correct in finding by clear and convincing evidence that the element of mutual
acquiescence was established.
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b.

The district court did not err in finding that the evidence was
sufficiently compelling to grant EBF summary judgment under the
clear and convincing standard of proof because the undisputed facts
confirm that, for over forty years, the parties' predecessors in
interest mutually acquiesced in the Original Fence as the boundary
between the properties.

Applying the clear and convincing evidence standard, the district court followed
the formulation employed by the Maine Supreme Court8 which requires boundary by
acquiescence claims to be proven by clear and convincing evidence. See_ Ruling and
Order, pg. 19 (R. 419). In Anchorage Realty Trust v. Donovan, 880 A.2d 1110 (Me.
2004), the Maine Supreme Court held that a plaintiff has the burden "to convince a factfinder by clear and convincing evidence, i.e., to a high probability, the truth of the
elements necessary to establish a boundary by acquiescence are highly probable." Id. at
1113 (citation omitted). This was the standard of proof employed by the district court in
granting EBF summary judgment on its claim of boundary by acquiescence.

Kay's

argument, however, that the district court did not in actuality adhere to this standard of
proof is unjustified.
The undisputed testimony of the witnesses in this action confirms that, for over
forty years, the owners of the two properties and their families all acquiesced in the
Original Fence as the boundary between the properties. To acquiesce in a boundary line,
"a landowner must recognize and treat an observable line, such as a fence, as the
The district court's Ruling and Order stated that Maine's formulation of the clear and
convincing standard seems consistent with the clear and convincing standard applied by
the Utah Supreme Court in other areas of law, citing Lovett v. Continental Bank & Trust
Co., 4 Utah 2d 76, 78-79, 286 P.2d 1065 (1955) (indicating that clear and convincing
evidence is evidence which is "very highly probable"). See_ Ruling and Order, pg. 19 (R.
419).
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boundary dividing the owner's property from the adjacent landowner's property
regardless of whether the landowner knows where the actual boundary lies or whether the
boundary is uncertain."

Ault, 2002 UT 33, f 19.

Ault further stated that "[t]he

acquiescence, or recognition, may be tacit and inferred from evidence, i.e., the
landowner's actions with respect to a particular line may evidence the landowner
impliedly consents, or acquiesces, in that line as the demarcation between the properties."
Id. Furthermore, as noted in Stoker, in '"most cases, the acquiescence is an unconscious
act with no thought being given during the period of acquiescence to the boundary, let
alone with surveying it.'" Stoker, 785 P.2d at 422 (quoting Hollidoy v. Guff, 685 P.2d
500, 509 (Utah 1984) (Howe, J., dissenting)).

Once the owners acquiesce in the

boundary line for the requisite twenty-year period, title to the property is vested in the
owner by operation of law, and title cannot thereafter be destroyed by later discovery of
the true boundary. See Veibell, 2004 UT 60,1 31.
In addition, this Court has stated that "[occupation up to, but never over, the line
is evidence of acquiescence." Id. at | 25. Furthermore, "[acquiescence may also be
shown by silence, or the failure of a party to object to a line as a boundary." Id. In
Veibell, this Court affirmed a judgment of boundary by acquiescence where the evidence
showed the property owners "farmed up to the fence line since 1938, and they never
occupied the land south of the fence." Id. at \ 27. The Court further noted that "the
[owners] never objected to the fence line as the boundary." Id.
In Stoker, this Court reviewed an order of summary judgment in which the district
court had "deferred to fence lines as property boundary lines over those established by a
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record title survey." Staker, 785 P.2d at 418. This Court affirmed the district court's
order of summary judgment, determining that "the undisputed facts establish all of the
first four requirements of the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence." Id. at 421. This
case is on all fours with Staker. In this action, as in Staker, there "is no indication in the
record that any predecessor in interest behaved in a fashion inconsistent with the belief
that the fenceline was the boundary." Id. at 420. Moreover, just like in Staker, the
Andrews family and the Fowkes family "farmed, irrigated, and raised livestock only
within their respective fenced areas." Id. Finally, as in Staker, there is nothing in the
record to indicate "that any land owner ever notified his neighbor of a disagreement over
the true boundary." Id.
In this action, property owners and witnesses with day-to-day experience from
both sides of the Original Fence have uniformly testified that they all believed the
Original Fence was the boundary between the properties. See_ Veibell, 2004 UT 60, % 27
(relying on testimony of landowner's brother who worked on the farm and who "testified
that he always believed that the fence was the true boundary"). Vemess Andrews and
Oral Taylor, prior owners of the EBF Property, have both testified that they believed the
Original Fence was the boundary between the properties. (R. 93, 124-125, 223-224, 228229). In addition, Delos Andrews, who was involved in the family's ranch operations
from 1971 until the property was sold in 1998, has also testified that there was never a
dispute about the fence being the boundary between the properties. (R. 104, 114-115,
225-227).
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After the Andrews family ceased dry farming their side of the Original Fence after
six or seven years and began raising cattle, the location of the Original Fence did not
change. (R. 126, 229-230). The location of the Original Fence was not tied to the
particular business operations of these families. Instead, the Original Fence was fixture
on the land that had existed since both families started their respective farming
operations. These facts refute any suggestion by Kay that the Original Fence may not
have been intended to be a boundary, but was instead intended to fence in the Andrews'
livestock. See Ringwood v. Bradford, 269 P.2d 1053, 1054 (Utah 1954) (affirming trial
court's finding that the fence was not intended as a boundary marker because evidence
was presented the fence at issue was constructed merely to protect newly planted Box
Elder trees from sheep grazing in the area).
On the other side of the Original Fence, the undisputed testimony of Tom Fowkes
and Dale Fowkes further confirms that the Fowkes family always treated the Original
Fence as the boundary between the properties, thereby confirming that Kay's
predecessors in interest had acquiesced in the Original Fence as the boundary. Tom
Fowkes, who was bom in 1947, testified that the Original Fence was in existence when
he was bom. (R. 153, 155, 158, 233, 235). He farmed his family's property from his
childhood until sometime in the 1970s. (R. 152, 234). Based on his experience working
on the farm, Tom Fowkes understood the Original Fence to be the boundary between the
properties. (R. 154, 234). Tom Fowkes further testified that his family maintained the
Original Fence on occasion. (R. 147, 233). Dale Fowkes also testified that the Original
Fence was in existence when he was born in 1949. (R. 139, 233). Dale Fowkes
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conducted farming activities on the family property until the property was sold to Kay.
(R. 138, 233). Dale Fowkes further confirmed his understanding that the Original Fence
was the boundary between the properties, and he denied knowledge of any disputes about
where the boundary was between the two properties. (R. 139, 232-233).
The testimony of all of these witnesses is consistent with one another, and Kay has
not presented any witnesses to refute the testimony given. There is simply no evidence of
any kind to contradict the district court's finding that mutual acquiescence in the
boundary had occurred, and that a boundary by acquiescence was created.

This

unrefuted testimony from witnesses on both sides of the Original Fence satisfies the clear
and convincing standard of proof and justifies the district court's finding that the parties'
predecessors in interest had mutually acquiesced in the Original Fence as the boundary
between the properties.
i. The district court properly relied on the testimony of Tom
Fowkes and Dale Fowkes in finding that Kay's predecessors had
acquiesced in the Original Fence as the boundary between the
properties.
Kay argues that the testimony of Tom Fowkes and Dale Fowkes, neither of whom
were prior owners of the Kay Property, is insufficient to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that Kay's predecessors had acquiesced in the Original Fence as the
boundary between the properties.

This argument rests on the proposition that

observations of the Fowkes brothers regarding the boundary line, coupled with their
understanding based on their experience with the property that the Original Fence was
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always the boundary, is insufficient to show that Kay's predecessors in interest
"intended" to recognize a visible line, i.e., the Original Fence, as the boundary.
This precise issue regarding the testimony of non-fee holders was addressed and
rejected in Veibell. In Veibell, the party opposing the claim of boundary by acquiescence
argued that there could be no boundary by acquiescence because there was no direct
evidence from the prior fee holders, both of whom were deceased, that they believed the
fence at issue to be the boundary. Veibell, 2004 UT 60, | 26. Instead, evidence of the
recognition of the fence as the boundary was reasonably inferred from the testimony of
the fee-holder's brother, Bryce Ericksen, who had worked on the farm who testified that
"he always believed that the fence was the true boundary." Id. at | 27. This reasonable
inference of acquiescence was further supported by the following facts:
The Ericksens' actions over the years also indicate that they
have recognized the fence as a boundary. They have farmed
up to the fence line since 1938, and they have never occupied
the land south of the fence. Furthermore, the Ericksens never
objected to the fence line as the boundary. In light of these
facts, the trial court's inference of the Ericksens'
acquiescence is not clearly erroneous.
Id.
Based on the foregoing facts, Veibell affirms that acquiescence can be established
based on the testimony of the relevant family members with knowledge of the property.
The relevant testimony to be considered is therefore not limited only to fee-holders of the
property. Furthermore, "because acquiescence may be inferred from the landowner's
actions, the absence of direct evidence of a prior owner's subjective belief concerning the
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boundary is not fatal to an assertion of mutual acquiescence." Id, at f 26.

"This

especially holds true where the owner is deceased and unable to testify." Id.
In the present case, all except one of Kay's prior predecessors in interest is
deceased. John L. Fowkes died on December 14, 1957. (R. 333, 348). Maud Fowkes
died on July 9, 1965. (R. 329-331, 348). Blanche F. Cloward died on October 9, 1990.
(R. 327, 348). Daryl H. Stanley died on July 3, 2005.9 (R. 325, 348). The only living
predecessor in interest to the Kay Property is Olive Stanley, but she did not participate in
farming activities on the family property. (R. 150, 155, 235). In any event, there is no
evidence that Olive Stanley or any of the deceased fee-holders to the Kay Property ever
took "some action manifesting that they [did] not acquiesce or recognize" the Original
Fence as the boundary. Ault, 2002 UT 33, f 20. Furthermore, there is no evidence that
any of Kay's predecessors objected to the treatment of the Original Fence as the
boundary or to the Andrews family's occupation and use of the property now in dispute.
Indeed, the undisputed evidence confirms that the Original Fence was always treated as
the boundary between the properties. Therefore, the district court did not err in accepting
the testimony of Tom Fowkes and Dale Fowkes, which was not contradicted by any other
witness, that Kay's predecessors had acquiesced in the Original Fence as the boundary by
clear and convincing evidence. The district court's ruling is entirely consistent with
VeibelL Accordingly, the district court should be affirmed.

9

Daryl Stanley died prior to the time in which the parties held their attorneys' planning
meeting and commenced discovery in the underlying action. See_ Attorneys' Planning
Meeting Report and [Proposed] Case Management Order (R. 22-25).
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ii. Utah law does not require evidence of "affirmative" acts to
establish acquiescence in a boundary.
As this Court noted in Stoker when it rejected the requirement of "objective
uncertainty," in "most cases, the acquiescence is an unconscious act with no thought
being given during the period of acquiescence to the boundary, let alone with surveying
it." Staker, 785 P.2d at 422 (quoting Halliday, 685 P.2d at 509 (Howe, J., dissenting)).
Furthermore, "[t]he acquiescence, or recognition, may be tacit and inferred from the
evidence, i.e., the landowner's actions with respect to a particular line may evidence the
landowner impliedly consents, or acquiesces, in that line as the demarcation between the
properties." Ault, 2002 UT at 1f 19; see also. Mason v. Loveless, 2001 UT App. 145, f 20,
24 P.3d 997 (stating that settled case law "clearly provides that acquiescence may be
established by silence").
The case of Lane v. Walker, 505 P.2d 1199 (Utah 1973) is also instructive in
explaining that affirmative acts are not necessary to establish a boundary by
acquiescence. In Lane, this Court affirmed the lower court's judgment which established
a boundary by acquiescence, explaining that acquiescence did not need to be based on the
mutual "intent" of the parties:
[T]he test to establish the boundary by "acquiescence"
necessarily need not be based on mutual "intent." "Intent" is
not synonymous with "acquiescence" in these cases.
"Acquiescence" is more nearly synonymous with
"indolence," or "consent by silence[.]"
Id. at 1200.
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In a more recent decision, this Court cited Lane, and again noted that
"acquiescence can consist of indolence or consent by silence." Carter v. Hanrath, 925
P.2d 960, 962 (Utah 1996). These cases are directly contrary to Kay's argument that
courts should be required "to look to affirmative acts as the Court of Appeals did" in
Argyle v. Jones, 2005 UT App. 346, 118 P.3d 301 (Utah Ct App. 2005). See Appellant
Brief, pg. 28. In Argyle, the appellate court cited Glenn v. Whitney, 116 Utah 267, 209
P.2d 257 (1949), in stating that Argyle was required to show more than "inaction" by the
neighboring owner.

Id. at \ 14.

Whitney, however, was based on the "objective

uncertainty" doctrine that was expressly rejected by this Court in Staker. See_ Stoker, 785
P.2d at 422 (citing Whitney as one of the cases that had adopted the "objective
uncertainty" requirement). Moreover, Argyle is distinguishable from the present case
because one of the owners actually knew where the true boundary was located. Argyle,
2005 UT App. 346, \ 15. There is no similar evidence in this case.
In any event, Staker is directly on point in confirming that no "affirmative" act is
necessary to establish a boundary by acquiescence.

In Staker, the property owners

farmed and irrigated only within their respective properties, no one acted inconsistently
with the fence being the boundary, and no one ever objected that the fence was not the
boundary. Staker, 785 P.2d at 420-21. That is precisely the evidence that exists in this
case.

Therefore, Kay's argument that this Court should require a showing of an

affirmative act to establish acquiescence in a boundary should be rejected as contrary to
established precedent in this State.
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iii. Rather than showing mere occupation up to a line, the district
court correctly concluded that EBF had established the element
of mutual acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence.
On appeal, Kay argues that, without more, mere occupation up to a visible line
does not prove acquiescence by clear and convincing evidence. See_ Appellant Brief, pg.
23. EBF recognizes that pursuant to Utah law, the elements of boundary by acquiescence
include both occupation up to a visible line as well as mutual acquiescence.
Nevertheless, Kay's argument misses the mark because the evidence at the trial level
established not only occupation up to the Original Fence, but it also established mutual
acquiescence in the Original Fence as the boundary between the properties by clear and
convincing evidence.
As EBF has previously pointed out, Kay has not contested that the element of
occupation up to a visible line has been established. Kay's Issue for review instead
challenges the sufficiency of the evidence regarding the element of acquiescence. See
Appellant Brief pg. 2. Indeed, Kay's brief acknowledges that "it is undisputed that Kay's
predecessors occupied to the fence." Id., at pg. 26. Kay's argument, however, that the
district court's finding of mutual acquiescence was based on mere occupation is simply
erroneous.
In Veibell, this Court stated that "[c]ourts have looked at various landowner
actions as evidence of acquiescence in a visible line as a boundary. Occupation up to, but
never over, the line is evidence of acquiescence." Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f 25 (citing
Staker, 785 P.2d at 420-21). It is not the mere fact of occupation up to a visible line that
serves as evidence of acquiescence, but rather it is occupation up to, but never over, the
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line that Utah courts will view as evidence of acquiescence. Moreover, in Staker, this
Court cited the following facts in discussing the element of "mutual acquiescence":
There is no indication in the record that any predecessor in
interest behaved in a fashion inconsistent with the belief that
the fence line was the boundary. Owners occupied houses,
constructed buildings, farmed, irrigated, and raised livestock
only within their respective fenced areas. One residence in
particular, belonging to the Shanes, is built up to a fence line
and is cut into two parts by the new survey line. This house
has been standing for over eighty years. Additionally, there is
no indication that any landowner ever notified his neighbor of
a disagreement over the true boundary.
Staker, 785 P.2d at 420-21.
Significantly, although Staker listed some of these same facts in discussing the
element of "occupation up to a line," id, at 420, this Court cited these facts again under
the acquiescence element. Thus, Staker recognized that activities within the fenced areas
do constitute evidence of mutual acquiescence.

Therefore, Kay's argument that the

"subjective intent" of Kay's predecessor fee owners could not be shown in satisfaction of
the requirement of mutual acquiescence is incorrect. To the contrary, as in Staker, the
activities of the parties within the fenced areas constituted evidence of mutual
acquiescence. All of the witnesses in this case have confirmed that the Fowkes family
and the Andrews family occupied and farmed their respective properties up to the
Original Fence, but never over the fence line. Furthermore, consistent with Staker, there
has been no evidence presented that any of the landowners ever notified his neighbor of a
disagreement over the true boundary between the properties.

Instead, both families

respected the Original Fence as the boundary between the properties.
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Contrary to what Kay argues, these factual findings do not constitute a conflation
of the "occupation" element with the "acquiescence" element. Certainly, circumstances
exist where adjoining landowners occupy property up to a visible line, yet one of the
landowners may not acquiesce in the 'Visible line" as the correct boundary. However,
that is simply not the case here. Instead, the undisputed testimony of the witnesses in this
case establishes the boundary between the properties was never in dispute and that both
families regarded the Original Fence as the boundary.

Furthermore, the evidence

confirms that the Fowkes family occupied up to, but never over, the Original Fence. In
ruling in favor of EBF, the district court properly considered the actions and activities of
the Fowkes family and the Andrews family which confirmed the element of mutual
acquiescence had been met by clear and convincing evidence. Accordingly, the district
court should be affirmed.
III.

Kay has not properly preserved his arguments regarding the law
abandonment of easements on appeal and, even if this Court were
consider the arguments now raised for the first time by Kay, the law
abandonment of easements is distinguishable from the doctrine
boundary by acquiescence.
a.

of
to
of
of

Kay's arguments regarding the law of abandonment of easements
was never raised before the trial court and cannot now be raised for
the first time on appeal.

On appeal, Kay argues for the first time that the standards governing the
abandonment of easements should be applied by this Court in settling the present claim of
boundary by acquiescence. This theory, however, was never raised before the trial court
and cannot now be raised on appeal. This Court has held that "'as a general rule, claims
not raised before the trial court may not be raised on appeal."' State v. Cram, 2002 UT
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37, | 9, 46 P.3d 230, 232 (quoting State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74, f 11, 10 P.3d 346. This
preservation rule "applies to every claim, including constitutional questions, unless a
defendant can demonstrate that 'exceptional circumstances' exist or 'plain error'
occurred." Cram, 46 P.3d at 232 (quoting Holgate, 10 P.3d at 350). This Court has
previously held that "[ojrderly procedure requires that a party must present his entire case
and his theory or theories to the trial court, and he cannot thereafter urge a different
theory in an attempt to prolong litigation." Clegg v. Lee, 516 P.2d 348, 353 (Utah 1973).
Furthermore, a party's failure "to argue an issue and present pertinent evidence in that
forum denies the trial court the opportunity to make any findings of fact or conclusions of
law pertinent to the claimed error." State v. Richins, 2004 UT App. 36, | 8, 86 P.3d 759
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Kay has not argued plain error by the trial court in failing to consider arguments
pertaining to the abandonment of easements. In addition, Kay has not argued that there
were exceptional circumstances that prevented the trial court from considering arguments
related to the abandonment of easements in deciding this property dispute. Instead, this is
merely a case in which Kay failed to advance an argument at the trial level which he now
wishes to raise for the first time on appeal. Because Kay's arguments concerning the
abandonment of easements have not been preserved on appeal, this Court should decline
to consider Kay's arguments regarding the abandonment of easements.
b.

The law of abandonment of easements is distinguishable from
boundary by acquiescence claims and is therefore inapplicable to
the present appeal.
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As EBF has noted above, Kay is barred from raising arguments for the first time
regarding the law of abandonment of easements on appeal which were never raised at the
trial level. However, even if this Court is willing to consider the merits of these new
arguments, Kay's argument is unavailing. Specifically, Kay argues that this Court should
apply the same standard of proof and analysis in boundary by acquiescence cases that it
applies in cases involving the abandonment of easements. See Appellant Brief, pgs. 2932. The case of Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder sets forth the elements of a
claim for abandonment of an easement:
It is well recognized that an easement or right of way may be
abandoned. However, to determine the issue of abandonment
several factors need be considered among which are whether
or not the right was acquired by prescription or grant, the
extent of its use, and the actual intent of the owner. This
court has previously recognized that a right gained by
conveyance may not be lost by non-use alone and that an
actual intent to abandon be evident.
***

In regard to the quantum of proof required on the issue of
abandonment, . . . the degree of proof required [is] that of
clear and convincing actions releasing the ownership and
right of use and an intentional abandonment, not a mere
preponderance of the evidence.
Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Teseder, 567 P.2d 181, 182 (Utah
1977) (internal citations omitted).
Relying on the law of abandonment of easements, Kay urges this Court to apply
the same considerations in deciding boundary by acquiescence claims. See_ Appellant
Brief pg. 31. First, Kay argues that "mere non-use of an easement is insufficient to
divest the owner of the dominant estate of his easement." Id. By analogy, Kay argues
that, in boundary by acquiescence cases, "mere occupation of one's property by another
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is not sufficient to divest her of her fee title." Id. EBF does not take issue with this
particular analogy. Clearly, occupation up to a visible line is only one of the necessary
elements of a boundary by acquiescence claim.

Significantly, the issue of parties'

respective occupation up to the Original Fence is not contested by Kay. See_ Appellant
Brief, pg. 33.
Kay also argues that since evidence of intent to abandon an easement is required,
the same degree of evidence should be required in boundary by acquiescence cases. Id.,
at pg. 31-32. This argument goes hand in hand with Kay's argument that the Court
should require clear and convincing proof in boundary by acquiescence cases because
clear and convincing proof is required in abandonment of easement cases. Id., at pg. 32.
Regarding the burden of proof required in boundary by acquiescence cases, Kay's
argument should be rejected because, as has already been addressed herein, this Court has
already held that boundary by acquiescence claims are established by a preponderance of
the evidence. See Elias v. Lea, 1978 Utah LEXIS 1129,12.
Furthermore, with respect to the requirement of acquiescence in a boundary, this
Court has held that "[c]ourts have looked at various landowner actions as evidence of
acquiescence in a visible line as a boundary. Occupation up to, but never over, the line is
evidence of acquiescence." Veibell, 2004 UT 60, f 25 (citing Staker, 785 P.2d at 42021). For the purposes of boundary by acquiescence claims, such evidence is sufficient to
establish acquiescence. Moreover, this Court has clearly stated that, in boundary by
acquiescence cases, "intent" is not synonymous with "acquiescence," and acquiescence
does not necessarily need to be based on mutual "intent." Lane, 505 P.2d at 1200.
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Therefore, to the extent that Kay advocates a different interpretation of what constitutes
evidence of acquiescence, Kay's argument is inconsistent with established Utah
precedent and should be rejected.
Lastly, Kay argues that evidence of "affirmative acts55 are required to prove the
element of acquiescence.

See_ Appellant Brief, pg. 32.

Notably, however, Kay5s

inclusion of this requirement in the context of his discussion of abandonment of easement
cases is questionable at best because none of the abandonment of easement cases cited by
Kay in his brief include "affirmative acts55 as a necessary element of the claim.10 In any
event, as EBF has already argued in this brief, Utah courts do not require evidence of
"affirmative acts55 to establish acquiescence in a boundary. For example, in Carter, this
Court stated that "acquiescence can consist of indolence or consent by silence.55 Carter,
925 P.2d at 962.

In addition, Stoker is directly on point in confirming that no

"affirmative55 act is necessary to establish a boundary by acquiescence. In Stoker, as in
this action, the parties farmed only within their respective boundaries, no one acted
inconsistently with the fence being the boundary, and no one ever objected that the fence
was not the boundary. Stoker, 875 P.2d at 420-21. These cases stand in clear opposition

JU

Kay cites Brown v. Oregon Short Line R. Co., 36 Utah 257, 265, 102 P. 740, 742
(1909) (citations omitted), which states: "An easement may be extinguished by an act of
the owner of the easement which is incompatible with the existence of the right claimed.
If the owner of the easement himself obstructs it in a manner inconsistent with its further
enjoyment, or permits the owner of the servient estate to do so, the easement will be
considered abandoned.55 Significantly, there is no requirement that abandonment be
established through the "affirmative act55 of the owner of the dominant estate. While an
affirmative act of the owner of the dominant estate may in fact establish an intent to
abandon the easement, Brown also contemplates that abandonment of an easement may
be established by permitting the owner of the servient estate to obstruct the easement.
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to Kay's argument that a showing of an affirmative act is necessary to establish
acquiescence in a boundary.
As shown herein, Utah cases governing boundary by acquiescence claims are
distinguishable from claims involving the abandonment of easements.

Accordingly,

Kay's argument which seeks to apply the rules governing abandonment of easement
claims to boundary by acquiescence actions is contrary to Utah precedent and should be
rejected by this Court.
IV.

The district court did not err in denying Kay's cross motion for partial
summary judgment.
The Issues for Review identified by Kay in his appellate brief do not allege that

the district court committed reversible error in denying his cross motion for summary
judgment.11 See. Appellant Brief, pg. 2. Nevertheless, Kay's concludes his brief by
asking this Court to reverse the judgment entered in favor of EBF and "order summary
judgment be entered in favor of Mr. Kay and against Appellee." Id, at pg. 40. At the
trial level, Kay's cross motion requested partial summary judgment decreeing that EBF
did not have a claim on the property in dispute under the doctrine of boundary by
acquiescence. (R. 260-261).
Section 5 of Kay's appellate brief contains the following heading: "The Trial
Court Erred in Denying Kay's Motion and Granting EBF's Motion for Summary
Judgment." Id., at pg. 32. This section is devoted to revisiting arguments Kay already
11

It should be noted that although the document at issue was captioned "Defendant
Steven L. Kay's Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment," Kay in actuality moved for
partial summary judgment, seeking a decree that EBF has no claim upon the property in
dispute under the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. (R. 260-261).
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raised earlier in his brief which challenge the district court's entry of summary judgment
in favor of EBF. Id, pgs. 32-39. Kay again erroneously contends that the district court's
finding of mutual acquiescence was based only on the fact of mere occupation up to the
Original Fence. Id, pg. 39. Furthermore, Kay again challenges the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the district court's conclusion that a boundary by acquiescence had
been established by clear and convincing evidence, but Kay does not raise any new
arguments. Id, pgs. 37-38.
EBF has already addressed these arguments at length herein and does not see any
purpose served in repeating those same arguments again.

In sum, the undisputed

evidence was sufficient to find by clear and convincing evidence that a boundary by
acquiescence was established. EBF therefore requests that this Court affirm the district
court's summary judgment ruling in its favor, and also affirm the denial of Kay's cross
motion.

CONCLUSION
The district court did not err in ruling that claims of boundary by acquiescence are
correctly decided under a preponderance of the evidence standard of proof. Furthermore,
even if this Court is persuaded that boundary by acquiescence claims require proof by
clear and convincing evidence, the district court should nevertheless be affirmed. In
ruling in favor of EBF, the district court applied the clear and convincing standard of
proof, finding that each of the elements of boundary by acquiescence had been met by
EBF. The district court's ruling was supported by the evidence and should therefore be
48

affirmed. Furthermore, because summary judgment was properly granted in favor of
EBF, the district court did not err in denying Kay's cross motion for summary judgment.
DATED this ~7

day of May, 2010.
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LEXSEE 1978 UTAH LEXIS 1129
J. Morrow Elias, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. James Lea and Laura Lea, Defendants, Counter Claimants, Third-Party Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. J. Morrow
Elias, and Mrs. J. Morrow Elias, Third-Party Defendants and Respondents.
No. 14885
Supreme Court of Utah
1978 Utah LEXIS 1129

February 7,1978, Filed
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes

Real Property Law > Adjoining Landowners > Boundaries
Real Property Law > Title Quality > Adverse Claim
Actions > General Overview
[HN1] The very presumptions of acquiescence relied
upon do not apply until the following elements are established by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely by some monument, (2) acquiescence in that line as a boundary (a)
by adjoining land owners, and (b) for a long period of
time.

Civil Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review >
Substantial Evidence > General Overview
[HN2] The court does not substitute its judgment of what
the facts are unless the ruling of the court below is clearly against the weight of the evidence.
COUNSEL:
respondent.

[*1]

John H. Allen for plaintiffs and

James F. Hausley for defendants and appellants.
John H. Allen for third-party defendants and respondents.
JUDGES: ELLETT, Chief Justice, wrote the opinion. I
CONCUR: J. Allan Crockett, Justice. HENRIOD, Retired Justice: (Concurring). WILKINS, Justice: (Dis-

senting). Maughan, Justice, concurs in the views expressed in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Wilkins.
Hall, Justice, having disqualified himself does not participate herein; Henriod, Retired Justice, sat.
OPINION BY: ELLETT
OPINION
ELLETT, Chief Justice: Mr. and Mrs. Lea appeal
from a judgment entered by the trial court quieting title
to a twenty-eight foot strip of land in Mr. Elias who was
the record owner thereof. The parties are adjoining
landowners and their deeds call for a common boundary
line to the east of a fence which has had a varied existence since it was erected.
The trial court refused to quiet title in Mr. and Mrs.
Lea on their claim of boundary by acquiesence, and they
now bring this appeal.
There is nothing in the record to show that any
agreement ever existed between the owners of the two
tracts of land to the effect that the fence was the true
boundary [*2] between the parcels. Nor was there any
evidence to indicate that the fence was intended to be a
dividing line since it was originally erected by the common owner of the two parcels of land.
In 1954, when the predecessor in interest of the respondent purchased the land, there existed only two stubs
of posts in what had originally been a fence built by the
owner of both pieces of property for his own purposes.
Thereafter, a wooden fence was erected, but the family
of the respondent had access to his property on both
sides thereof; never at any time did he consent to having
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the fence as the eastern boundary of his land. In 1973,
when a chain link fence was erected which deprived the
respondent and his family of access to their property to
the east, this lawsuit was initiated.
The appellants would have us reverse the trial court
in presumptions which more nearly indicate adverse
possession than they do acquiesence. [HN1] The very
presumptions relied upon do not apply until the following elements are established by a preponderance of the
evidence:
(1) Occupation up to a visible line marked definitely
by some monument,
(2) Acquiesence in that line as a boundary
(a) by adjoining [*3] land owners, and
(b) for a long period of time.
Appellants have failed in their proof of acquiesence
in the fence as a boundary. As pointed out in the case of
Riter v. Cayias, n. 1 the party losing the property must
have knowledge that his property is being claimed by
another. There is no proof that the respondent or any of
his predecessors in interest ever had any knowledge that
the property east of the fence was being claimed by
another. This statement is bolstered by the finding of
the trial court, towit:
3. At the time that defendants received the conveyance referred to in the previous paragraph, a fence
existed along a line going generally north and south approximately nine feet west of what is now the east line of
Lot 5, Millbrook Terrace Subdivision, said line being
close to the line on which a chain link fence erected by
defendants in 1973, now exists. Neither plaintiff and
third-party defendants J. Morrow Elias and Susan Lynn
Elias, nor their predecessors in title have acquiesced in
said line as a boundary.
The appellants urge us to overlook the finding of the
trial court who saw and heard the witnesses and render
our own findings at variance therewith. [*4] They
urge us to do so because of the provisions of Article VIII,
Section 9 of the Utah Constitution which so far as material, reads as follows:
...In equity cases the appeal may be on questions of
both law and fact; in cases at law the appeal shall be on
questions of law alone....
At the time the Constitution was adopted, equity
matters were submitted on depositions; therefore, members of the Supreme Court were just as capable of determining the facts in an equity case as was the trial judge.
By our court decision we have continued to consider the
facts of an equity case on appeal, but [HN2] we do not
substitute our judgment of what the facts are unless the

ruling of the court below is clearly against the weight of
the evidence.
In the instant matter, the ruling of the trial court was
based on proper, competent evidence and it is hereby
affirmed. Costs are awarded to the respondent.
I CONCUR: J. Allan Crockett, Justice
CONCUR BY: HENRJOD
CONCUR
HENRIOD, Retired Justice: (Concurring) I concur
in the conclusion reached by Mr. Chief Justice Ellett in
the main opinion. Both parties claimed title through
Wooley Company. That company owned both tracts,
whence the fence possibly [*5] could not have been a
boundary. This fence was burned a time or two, but fire
had nothing much to do with who thought was or was not
done to the title. To reject the trial court's conclusion
quieting title, in my opinion is not compelling on the
facts here, irrespective of the threadbare Constitutional
admonition (Art. VIII, Sec. 9) about reviewing the facts
as well as the law, - a practical bit of legerdemain employed for convenience. Stanley v Stanley, is a manly
primer, but withal the cases to date, the rule seems to
have been laid down that on appellate review, the trial
court's decision will be affirmed if there is substantial,
competent, admissible evidence to support it, - whether it
be the collective confusion of the jury, or the isolated,
appealed and therefore disputed interdiction of the court,
- be it that the Chancellor or that of the Common Pleas.
I believe that the record cannot stand the test of boundary
by acquiesence under the authorities ably collected in an
article pertinent to this problem, published in 3 Utah Law
Review, 1953, and cases following which easily may be
Shepardized and need no citation here, save by reference.
DISSENT BY: WILKINS
DISSENT
WILKINS,
[*6] WILKINS, Justice: (Dissenting) I respectfully dissent. In 1932, when the defendants took possession of their tract of land, there existed a barbed wire
fence running essentially parallel to and approximately
28 feet west of the boundary as described in the plaintiffs deed. (The description of plaintiffs tract overlapped
that described in defendant's deed by more than 8 feet.)
There was no evidence as to who built the fence, when
it was built or the purpose for which it was built. This
original fence remained intact until it was burned in 1954
except for several intervals prior thereto during which
the wires were down. Defendant James Lea repaired the
fence after each such interval, and he rebuilt the barbed
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wire fence after the fire in 1954, later replacing the
barbed wire fence with a wooden fence, and finally
erecting a chainlink fence in 1973. The majority opinion relies in part on the fact that plaintiff and his wife
had access to both sides of the fence, but Mrs. Elias testified that it was necessary to remove the wooden slats to
have access to the other side, and only small animals
such as chickens could get through the fence without
removal of the slats.
From [*7] 1932 until the time of trial, defendants
occupied the property east of the fence and plaintiff and
his predecessors occupied the property west of the fence.
Plaintiffs predecessors in title did not claim the property
east of the fence until 1954, when one of them, F. Grant
Woodward, asserted ownership. Woodward threatened,
but did not file suit to quiet title. No further claims were
asserted for another 19 years, until the plaintiff instituted
the present suit to quiet title, and for all that time, the
fence remained in the same position.
The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence was
originally an extension of the boundary by agreement
doctrine. The latter doctrine allows adjoining land
owners to establish a boundary line by oral agreement
where the true line is unknown, uncertain, or in dispute.
Where there is no proof of an actual agreement, boundary by acquiescence applies, and ignorance, uncertainty
or dispute as to the true line and an agreement as to the
boundary will be presumed ] if the following elements
are established: (1) occupation up to a visible line
marked by monuments, fences or buildings and (2) acquiescence in the line as the boundary (3) for a long period [*8] of years and (4) by adjoining landowners.2
1 Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 29 Utah
2d 421, 511 P.2d 145 (1973).
2 Fuoco v. Williams, 15 Utah 2d 156, 389 P.2d
143 (1964). See also the second appeal of that
case, 18 Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 944 (1966).
It is the second element, acquiescence in the line as
the boundary, which the District Court found was not
established.
The term "acquiescence" was defined by this Court
in Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199,
1200 (1973):
...the test to establish the boundary by "acquiescence" mecessarily need not be based on mutual "intent."
"Intent" is not synonymous with "acquiescence" in these
cases. "Acquiescence" is more nearly synonymous with
"indolence," or "consent by silence," - or a knowledge
that a fence or other monuments appear to be a boundary,
- but that no one did anything about it for 48 years....

The test articulated above contains three elements:
(1) knowledge (2) of an apparent boundary (3) and a
failure to act in the face [*9] of such knowledge.
The first requirement in the Lane test for acquiescence is knowledge of the apparent boundary. The evidence shows that the fence was visible for the entire period of 1932 to 1954 at which time it burned. There is
some conflict in the evidence as to the date it was replaced by defendants, but it is clear it was rebuilt by
1958, and that since 1954, the posts of the old fence remained. Defendants' use of the property up to the fence
line was also open to observation by the plaintiffs predecessors. It is clear, therefore, that plaintiffs predecessors knew of the fence and defendants' use of the property.
The second requirement in the Lane test is that
there be an apparent boundary. Here, the use of the land
by defendants up to the fence, coupled with the lack of
use beyond the fence by plaintiffs predecessors, is an
indication that the fence was a dividing line. Also, here,
the fence unlike the irrigation ditch found not to be a
boundary in Fuoco v. Williams, supra, note 2, was visible, permanent, and had a definite location and further
had no purpose other than as a boundary.3
3
Even if the fence were built by the common
grantor for purposes other than boundary, this
would not prevent the fence from operating as a
boundary once the property is conveyed to separate owners. Baum v. Defa, Utah, 525 P.2d 725
(1974).
[*10] The final element in the acquiescence test is
a failure to act. In 1954 Woodward asserted a claim
against the property west of the fence line, but did nothing to clear title to the property. Thereafter, the disputed
area was conveyed by plaintiffs predecessors only by
quit claim deeds, though warranty deeds were used to
convey the rest of plaintiffs property. As of 1954 the
fence had been in existence for over 22 years and at that
time the boundary was already established. There followed an additional 19 years during which all of the
plaintiffs and their predecessors acquiesced in the fence
as a boundary, and none of them took action to assert
their claims. The fence has now been in the same place
for 41 years, and this Court should confirm title to the
disputed area in the defendants who have used it for all
of that period of time.
Maughan, Justice, concurs in the views expressed in
the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Wilkins.
Hall, Justice, having disqualified himself does not
participate herein; Henriod, Retired Justice, sat.

